Expectations for family transitions in young adulthood among the UK second generation i ABSTRACT This paper explores whether family transitions among descendants of post second-worldwar immigrants are converging towards those of white British young adults by examining family formation expectations among 16-21 year-olds collected within the 2009-2015 waves of Understanding Society. We ask: Do current adolescents' cohabitation, marriage and parenthood expectations differ by ethnic group? Are differences similar for men and women? Are ethnic differences mediated by individual or parental socio-economic characteristics? We find that expectations for marriage and parenthood are unanimously high, but that there is greater uncertainty among white British and black Caribbean adolescents as to the age at which these transitions will occur. We find large ethnic differences in expectations for cohabitation, especially for women. There is evidence for a divergence in expectations within the south-Asian community. Second-generation Indians have lower expectations for marriage and higher expectations for cohabitation than secondgeneration Bangladeshis or Pakistanis. Ethnic group differences remain when religiosity, parental background and individual characteristics are controlled. Further research is required regarding the mechanisms which underlie the differential transmission of family formation attitudes across ethnic minority groups.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 40 years family formation trajectories to adulthood within Western countries have become extended and de-standardized in terms of their sequencing and reversibility (Elzinga & Liefbroer, 2007) . Cohabitation has increasingly overtaken marriage as the first partnership type, with parenthood increasingly occurring outside of marriage, delayed to later ages, or foregone (Balbo et al., 2013) . In part these changes can be seen as part of the second demographic transition (Van de Kaa, 1987) wherein new living arrangements such as cohabitation are seen as expressions of secular sentiments of younger cohorts (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 227) . In individualized Western cultures, diversity, exploration and instability are key characteristics of Arnett's emerging adults (those aged between 18 and 25) who have left the dependency of childhood and adolescence but do not have adult responsibilities and are thus freer to explore different experiences (Arnett, 2000) . This exploration may include different relationships and sexual behaviours, including premarital sexual relations (Gravel et al., 2016) . However, not all young people have the same preferences, or opportunities, for such exploration.
Gender, ethnicity, class background, and geographical locality all influence trajectories to adulthood, often in an intersecting way. This paper focuses on ethnic differences in family trajectories, specifically the family expectations of second generation adolescents who often have to negotiate contrasting value systems -those associated with their parents' heritage culture, and those which dominate in the UK.
The highly individualised value system that exists in the majority white British culture promotes the private self, individual freedom, and autonomous decision making.
In contrast, collectivistic value systems, common in Eastern countries, traditionally emphasise strong family bonds, promotion of the wellbeing of the wider family and kin group over own personal need, and a higher degree of parental influence on partner selection (Peterson & Bush, 2013; Lalonde et al., 2004) . Possibilities for exploration in partnerships and sexuality are therefore more limited in many collectivistic cultures where marriage is often seen as the only acceptable setting for intimate relations, dating and sexual activity prior to marriage considered inappropriate (Gravel et al., 2016; Kim, 2009 ). Furthermore, family formation decisions in collectivistic cultures may involve family members beyond the individual.
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First generation immigrants from collectivistic cultures, such as those migrating from south Asia, often retain strong support for their heritage culture, having been socialised in these collectivistic norms within the family, and interactions with peers in school, work and wider society (Din, 2006; Gigèure et al., 2010) . Second (and subsequent) generations are exposed to the norms and values of their parents' heritage culture, as well as the expectations of the contemporary mainstream culture in which they live (Dasgupta, 1998; Gigèure et al., 2010 Sen Das, 2016 . They must negotiate their identities through these, often conflicting, cultures (Dwyer, 2000; Gravel et al., 2016) .
Academics, politicians and the general public often view convergence in partnership and childbearing attitudes and behaviour towards the dominant majority as a sign of assimilation (Alba & Nee, 1997; Gordon, 1964; Kulu et al., 2017; Sobolewska et al., 2017) . In the UK, commentators have looked to marriage practices, particularly arranged marriage, to highlight the extent to which ethnic minorities are culturally integrated into mainstream society (Ahmad, 2012; Casey, 2016) . It is thus of academic and general interest to examine family expectations among the growing second (and subsequent 1 )
generations in the UK.
Over and above questions of cultural assimilation, it is important to understand the factors associated with the timing and sequencing of family transitions since they can have implications for later life chances. Young parenthood is associated with poorer outcomes for parents and their children (Jaffee et al., 2001) , although part of these relationships are due to the selection into early parenthood of those from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds (Hotz et al., 2005) . Early parenthood is also associated with larger completed family size, irrespective of socio-economic factors (Berrington et al., 2015a) .
Understanding partnership formation is important as cohabiting partnerships tend to be less stable than marriage (Beaujouan & Ni Bhrolcháin, 2011) and because UK law treats married and cohabiting couples differently (Perelli-Harris & Gassen, 2012) providing less protection of ex-cohabiting partners following dissolution (Barlow et al., 2005) .
The contribution of this paper is largely empirical. It is the first ever paper examining family formation expectations of adolescents from the white British and 1 Henceforth second generation is used to refer to second and subsequent generations.
6 second generation minority ethnic communities. The aim is to identify patterns and associations, not identify detailed mechanisms for observed differences across groups (since this is not possible with the data or sample sizes available). We establish whether there are ethnic differences, whether these differ by sex, and whether they are mediated by parental background factors, religiosity, or the young person's educational and employment situation. The following section summarizes the UK context and existing evidence concerning family formation patterns among first and second generation British ethnic minorities. Subsequently the paper reviews mechanisms for the inter-generational transmission of family attitudes and describes the analytical framework which sees adolescents' expectations for family formation influenced by ethnic group, religiosity, parental background factors and structural integration in terms of education and employment (Plotnik, 2007) .
THE UK CONTEXT: ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN FAMILY
The UK experienced considerable post-war immigration: black Caribbeans primarily from Jamaica in the 1950s and 1960s, Indians from India and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s; Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the 1970s and 1980s (Peach, 2006) . First generation migrants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, tended to replicate traditional patterns of early childbearing within marriage (Ballard, 1990; Jejeebhoy, 1998) , but with significant differences in the overall level of fertility. Family sizes of first generation Indian migrants, including highly educated Indians who migrated from East Africa, were significantly lower (around 2.7) at the outset, than those of women arriving from (predominantly rural areas of) Pakistan or Bangladesh at around 5 and 7 births per woman respectively (Dubuc, 2012) . South Asian men typically initially migrated to the UK alone, their families remaining behind (Din, 2006) . Family reunification then followed, first among the Sikhs and Gujaratis Hindu communities during the 1960s, and later among Muslim communities from Mirpuri and Sylhet (Ballard, 1977) .
Post-war migration from the Caribbean also took the form of early pioneers, more often men, followed by family reunification. Traditionally, the Caribbean family system was highly individualised with a family centred around two or three generations of women, their children and often-absent men (Shaw, 2014) . Foner (1977) describes how marriage in rural Jamaica took place at a relatively late age. Premarital relationships were 7 common, and often did not involve common residence, men remaining in their parents'
household. First generation Caribbean migrants to Britain are thought by Foner (1977) to have been rather more traditional in their family formation patterns, with shorter durations of non-marital cohabitation and a younger age at marriage, so as to comply with expectations for early marriage dominant in the UK in the 1950s and 1960s.
Research on the experience of the second generation born in the UK in the 1950s-1970s suggests a rapid convergence across ethnic minority groups in overall family size towards the UK average. Fertility levels during the 1990s and early 2000s among second generation Indian women were similar, or even a little lower than the UK average, but remained a little higher among second generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi women (Dubuc, 2012) . Although second generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi women had fewer children at younger ages as compared to their mothers' generation, they continued to have larger completed family sizes than the UK average due to more third and fourth births (Kulu et al., 2017) . Existing findings suggest there has been rather less convergence across ethnic groups in the types of partnership that are formed (Berrington, 1994; Hannemann & Kulu, 2015) . Among the second generation, rates of cohabitation were significantly higher among black Caribbeans, and much lower for south Asians, amongst whom marriage continued to be the norm (Berrington, 1994) . New empirical evidence from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) describing the average timing and sequencing of family formation for cohorts born in the UK in [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] (Table 1) is consistent with this literature. Only one in five British-born black Caribbean men and women had married by age 30. However, almost two thirds had lived with a partner, and 80% of first births were prior to marriage. In contrast, British-born south Asians were far more likely to have married -only a minority living with their partner beforehand, and the vast majority making the transition to parenthood within marriage. Previous research highlighted differences in the timing of family formation within the south Asian groups whereby second generation Indian women were postponing marriage and childbearing to later ages (Berrington, 1994) , associated with their older age at leaving full time education and a greater likelihood of paid employment among Indian women as compared to Pakistani or Bangladeshi women (Ballard, 1977; Dale et al., 2002) . This postponement can also be seen in Table 1 where 62% of men and 74% of women had married by age 30. Nevertheless the likelihood of marriage among British Indians was still significantly higher than for the white majority. In addition to marriage timing, the literature emphasises differences in marriage practices within south Asians. Ballard (1990) highlighted differing marriage rules whereby Sikhs and Hindus were barred from marrying their close kin, whereas Muslims were encouraged to do so. These rules were associated with very different levels of transnational marriage. According to Ballard (1990) , although early cohorts of Sikhs born in the UK did seek spouses from the Punjab, locally arranged marriages (or matches with the overseas Sikh Dispora) were the norm by the 1980s. In contrast, marriage with
Pakistan-based partners remained much more frequent amongst UK-based Mirpuris, not least due to parents'obligations to their Pakistani-based biraderi (Shaw, 2014) . Whilst parents traditionally play an important role in the selection of a spouse among south Asian minorities, there has been a shift over time in the perceptions of arranged marriages as being 'risky', among parents and their children (Qureshi et al., 2012, p. 273) . The literature has repeatedly highlighted the desire for second generation Asians to have a say in whom they marry (Ahmad, 2006; Din, 2006) and young women especially are using their greater educational achievements and financial autonomy as leverage in marriage decisions (Ahmad, 2006; Shaw, 2014) . Additionally, researchers have discussed how
Islam has increasingly been used as a resource for young women to assert their rights in terms of marriage decisions (Qureshi et al., 2012; Din, 2006) . Thus the role of parents is increasingly been described in terms of 'assisted' (Ahmad, 2006) or 'introduced' marriage (Twamley, 2014) , rather than 'arranged'.
It is important to distinguish between the behaviour of second generation young people born in the 1950s-1970s (the focus of past research), and the expectations of more recent birth cohorts. Transitions in young adulthood have generally become more uncertain and risky (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007) . Current adolescents face greater difficulty in securing employment with sufficient stability and level of income to allow residential independence and family formation. Ethnic capital (Shah et al., 2010 ) may act as protection for some ethnic groups, for example by promoting the importance of educational achievement. There has been an increase in the age at leaving full time education generally in the UK since the 1980s, but the increase in educational aspirations and achievement (Crawford and Greaves, 2015) has been more rapid among ethnic minorities. Thus the timing of transitions to the labour market and partnership formation among recent cohorts of ethnic minorities are likely to be delayed as compared with earlier cohorts (Ní Bhrolcháin & Beaujouan, 2012) . Finally, in comparison to earlier cohorts of second generation, attachment to the labour force among south Asian women is now stronger, due to increased human capital and language proficiency (Khattab et al., 2017) . Therefore, in this paper we examine ethnic group differences in expectations for family formation among cohorts born 1989 to 1999, now aged 16-21.
INTER-GENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF EXPECTATIONS FOR FAMILY FORMATION
Assimilation theories (Alba & Nee, 1997; Portes & Zhou, 1993) are generally used to understand how family formation behaviours of ethnic minorities change according to the cultural distance between origin and destination country, the time since arrival, and generation (Kulu et al., 2017) . De Valk & Liefbroer (2007) explain that where the norms and family formation preferences dominant in the country of origin contrast with those of the country of destination, second generations are exposed both to parental preferences and to preferences existing in the country of settlement. The family formation preferences of the second generation are influenced by both parents' preferences and behaviour, but also ideas and norms gained as a result of being socialized in the destination countryfrom peers, school and the wider community. The behaviour of second generation ethnic minorities will thus be more like those of the destination country than was the case for their parents. Such 'linear assimilation' theories have been critiqued; for ignoring the continuing importance of transnational relationships among ethnic minorities (Qureshi et al, 2012; Reynolds, 2006; Shaw, 2014) and for assuming convergence towards a single (Western) model of individualised family system (Ahmad, 2012; Shaw, 2014) .
Nevertheless, most researchers agree that 'normative conflict' between second generation youth and their parents is especially likely in the area of sexual activity and partnership formation (Giguére et al., 2010; LaLonde et al., 2004) .
The extent to which young adults from more collectivistic cultures are likely to adopt more individualistic attitudes towards family formation depends upon their socialisation, religion, and structural integration in to the host society (Gravel et al., 2016) . Parents play the most important role in socialization, influencing young people via their behaviour, parenting styles and attitudes (Peterson and Bush, 2013) . Parents act as role models and their own experiences of marriage, separation and childbearing are associated with the family formation trajectories of their young adult children (Axinn & Thornton, 1996) . Young people who have been brought up in a lone parent family tend to view marriage with more uncertainty and have more positive attitudes towards cohabitation (Crissey, 2005) , choosing cohabitation as a way to test their own relationship before committing themselves (Berrington et al., 2015b) .
In south Asian families where traditional cultural values emphasize the authority of elders and the wellbeing of the wider kin-group, parenting styles tend to be more authoritarian with greater surveillance and control over young adults (Peterson & Bush, 2013) . Describing young Pakistanis living in Bradford in the late 1990s, Din (2006, p. 64) notes that "Pakistani parents continue to make the most important decisions on behalf of their young people such as continuing one's schooling and future expectations".
However, important gender differences existed. "Boys were free to socialize outside of school, eat out, go to the cinema and select their own dress code" (Din, 2006, p. 123) , whereas girls experienced less freedom and more monitoring.
Religiosity is generally associated with more traditional patterns of family formation (Berrington et al., 2015b) , with cohabitation and non-marital childbearing associated with increased secularization (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Van de Kaa, 1987) . Part of the explanation for continued early marriage in south Asia is the desire to protect daughters from unsanctioned sexual activity prior to marriage (Kamal et al., 2015) .
Religious identity continues to shape the lives of muslim women in particular because traditional gender roles and chastity prior to marriage are linked to prestige and family honour/izzat (Shaw, 2014) . In the UK, south Asian parents' expectations regarding chastity prior to marriage are often a source of tension and conflict as second generations are influenced by the more liberal values of the majority white British culture. The intergenerational transmission of cultural norms about sexual behaviour and partnership formation thus involves "actively managing conflicting messages about acceptable behaviour" (Sen Das, 2016, p.2) , and there are variations e.g. according to ethnicity, religion and education in the degree to which more traditional rules regarding chastity are enforced. Ahmed (2012, p.205) suggests that "getting to know someone for the purposes of marriage" (but not dating in the western sense of 'boyfriend' or 'girlfriend') is increasingly acceptable among university-educated British muslims. In contrast, dating and premarital sexual relationships appear to be increasing among second generation British Indians (French, 2005) among whom 'love marriages' are preferred (Twamley, 2014) . 
FAMILY EXPECTATIONS IN YOUNG ADULTHOOD
Although plans regarding marriage and family formation shift and change during adolescence (Willoughby, 2010) , expectations reported in young adulthood have been shown to be useful predictors of behaviour (Clarkberg et al., 1995; Willoughby, 2014) .
In the US expectations to marry have consistently remained very high (Manning et al., 2007) , although Black young people perceive a lower likelihood of marriage compared to Whites, (Crissey, 2005) . However, we might not anticipate universally high expectations for marriage in the UK since cohabitation has replaced marriage to a greater extent than that seen in the US (Berrington et al., 2015b) . On the other hand, cohabitation
is not institutionalized and lacks a symbolic event i.e. a wedding, meaning that expectations for cohabitation may be more tentative and more uncertain than for marriage (Manning et al., 2007) . Previous UK research suggests that fertility preferences are formed early on in the life course, and that intended childlessness among British men and women is relatively rare (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014) . Nevertheless, just under a fifth of the female population remains childless at the end of their reproductive years (Berrington et al., 2015a) , and thus some uncertainty among adolescents as to the likelihood of becoming a parent would be expected.
DATA AND METHODS
The UKHLS is a longitudinal survey of the members of approximately 30,000 (private) 14 The main analysis sample used here consists of young adults born between 1989
and 1999 either in the UK or born abroad but who arrived in the UK prior to age 6. These 16-21 year-olds were questioned within a special 'young adult module' which asked about expectations for the likelihood of cohabitation, marriage and parenthood. Young adults who gave a full interview in either wave 2, 3 or 5 (n=7366) are included. Only the first wave in which they were a respondent is included in the analysis (even if the response was "don't know"). In this way respondents appear only once in the analysis, and their responses are not affected by panel conditioning. The implication of including the first response is that the age distribution is weighted towards those aged 16-17 as these groups include the 'rising 16s' i.e. those who were children in sample households who are now included in the main adult sample. At wave 6 two new questions were included in the 'young adult module' asking respondents their expected age at marriage and parenthood.
Thus for a sample of 3240 men and women aged 16-21 in 2014/15 we highlight ethnic group differences in the expected timing of family formation.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: EXPECTATIONS FOR COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD
Young adults are asked a series of probabilistic expectation questions (Manski, 2004; Herd, 2012) . Past research based on such quantitative expectations suggests that young adults are able to form reasonable beliefs about significant life events (Fischoff et al. 2000) , and that adolescents' expectations are positively related to their actual experiences (de Bruin et al., 2007) . The UKHLS survey asks: "Please tell me how likely it is that the following events will happen in your life in the future. If any of the following events have already happened, just let me know. On a scale from 0% to 100%, where 0% means 'No chance of happening' and 100% means 'Totally likely to happen'. The respondents are asked "How likely is it that you will ………Marry at some time / Live together unmarried with a partner / Have a child? The respondent is presented with a card showing a horizontal line from 0% to 100% with end points labelled: 0% labelled 'No chance will happen' and 100% labelled 'Totally likely to happen'. The very small number (maximum 3 % found for the white British group) who have already experienced the event, are given a value of 100. A potential challenge is the heaping of responses on 0, 50, or 100.
However, Manski (2004) among others has found that respondents do use the full expanse, often rounding to the nearest five percent in the middle of the range, and tending to report one percent intervals at the extremes. There tends to be heaping on 50%, and there is a debate as to whether this value represents a real probability, or epistemic uncertainty (Fischhoff et al., 1999 , Bruine de Bruin et al. 2000 .
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: EXPECTATIONS FOR AGE AT MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD
In wave 6 only, respondents are asked "At what age do you want to get married/ would you like to start a family?" If the respondent does not want to get married/become a parent the interviewer is instructed to enter a zero. A "don't know" response is permitted, and is given as a response by a significant minority of young men and women (See Tables A.4 and A.5 for details). Mean expected age at marriage and parenthood are calculated based on the sample who say they intend to get married / become a parent and give a numerical response. 
KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: ETHNIC GROUP

OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Sex is entered as a dummy variable. Age in completed years is a continuous variable.
Generation differentiates those who have at least one parent who was born in the UK (2.5 and 3rd generation) from those whose parents were both born overseas (2nd generation).
Religiosity is based on the respondents' response to the question (included in wave 1 and wave 4) "How much difference would you say religious beliefs make to your life? Would you say they make... 1 A great difference, 2 Some difference, 3 A little difference, 4 Or no difference?" The variable contrasts those who say that religion makes a great or some difference with those reporting that it makes little or no difference. Young people not present at either wave 1 or wave 4 are coded as 'not known'.
Parental separation is a dummy variable identifying those whose parents had either never lived together or who had separated. Since a significant minority of adolescents were not living with their father at the time of interview, we focus on maternal characteristics. These are either observed directly from the survey in cases where mothers are also part of the UKHLS sample, or for those no longer resident with their mother, we use responses to direct questions about their mother's level of education, whether she was working when the respondent was 14. Maternal education is coded as no qualifications, some qualifications less than degree, degree-level qualifications. Whether their mother is in paid work is coded as 0=no, 1=yes. Mother's age at first birth is grouped as: under 20, 20-24, 25-29 and 30+. The group for whom this information is not known tend to be older, and more likely to have already left the parental home prior to the start of UKHLS.
Item non-response is dealt with by the inclusion of not known categories.
Educational aspirations, coded as either 'low' or 'high', are used instead of attainment in order to include young people who are still studying. Among those who have left education, achieving A levels and above qualifications puts the young person in the 'high' aspiration group, whilst those whose highest qualification is either AS levels, GCSEs or below are coded as having 'low' aspirations. Those currently in further or higher education are coded in the 'high' group. For those still enrolled in school or sixth form we code those who aspire to achieve A levels and equivalent as 'high', with those who only aspire to achieve GCSE/ AS /AVCE level qualifications as 'low'. Economic activity identifies whether the respondent is currently employed, a full time student, unemployed or economically inactive. Region of residence distinguishes those living in London, from those living in the North, the Midlands, the rest of the south and East, and those living in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
ANALYTICAL STRATEGY
First we present descriptive analyses from the probabilistic expectations for cohabitation, marriage and parenthood, and for expected age at marriage and parenthood. Since a significant proportion of the answers to the expected age at marriage and parenthood were uncertain, and given the relatively small sample sizes within particular ethnic groups (see Tables A.4 and A.5) we do not attempt to undertake further multiple regression analyses of this outcome. However, for the probabilistic expectations questions we undertake proportional odds ordinal regression of grouped expectation (0-24%, 25-49%, 50%, 51-75% and 76-100%) of cohabiting, marrying and becoming a parent. Two models are fitted for each outcome, the first contains just ethnic group and other demographic characteristics: sex, age and immigrant generation. We test for the significance of a twoway interaction between ethnic group and sex, but only find it to be significant in the regressions of cohabitation expectations. The second model includes religiosity, parental background factors, and the respondent's educational and employment characteristics.
Comparison of the odds ratios for ethnic group in model 1 and in model 2 provides some indication as to whether ethnic group differences are mediated by these additional factors.
All analyses are weighted to be nationally representative using the cross-sectional weight corresponding to the wave in which the data were collected and all analyses take into account the clustering in the survey design (MacFall 2016). Figures 1a and 1b show the average expectations for cohabitation, marriage and parenthood by sex and ethnic group, whilst Appendix tables A.1-A.3 contain the detailed distributions. Few respondents (less than 5%) gave themselves a zero probability of marrying or becoming a parent, though a significant minority of non-white British adolescents do not expect to cohabit. Just over half of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men, and almost three quarters of Pakistani and Bangladeshi young women gave an expectation 19 of cohabitation of zero. The acceptance of cohabitation as a possibility is more common among young second generation Indian men and women (only around one third of men and one half of women give report a probability of zero). All of these groups contrast however with white British youth among whom only 5% and 4% of men and women give a zero expectation (Table A.1). White British youth -17% of men, 25% of women -were significantly more likely to give a response of 100% expectation that they would cohabit.
RESULTS
EXPECTATIONS FOR COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD
Black Caribbeans expected to cohabit more than south Asian youth. However, 8% of Indian men had a 100% expectation of cohabiting, and mean expectations for cohabitation are higher for Indian men and women than for Pakistanis or Bangladeshis, though the confidence intervals for the estimates for the three south Asian groups overlap (Figures   1a and 1b) . Mean expectations for marriage and parenthood are generally high (Table   A. 2), but there are differences according to ethnic group, with the mean expectation of marriage for south Asian men between 80% and 90% compared with an average of 69% for white British and black Caribbean men (Figures 1a and 1b) . The lowest average expectation for marriage is found for black Caribbean women at just 63%. As shown by the relative heights of the bars in Figure 1a and 1b, it is only among black Caribbean youth that we see a greater expectation for childbearing, than for either cohabitation or marriage.
Thus we find significant ethnic differences in expectations for the likelihood of cohabiting, marrying and becoming a parent. These differences are greatest for cohabitation and smallest for parenthood. We find some evidence of diversity within the south Asian groups whereby expectations to cohabit are higher for young Indians, than Pakistanis or Bangladeshis. Ethnic differences in expectations to marry or become a parent are similar by sex, but differences in expectations to cohabit according to ethnicity are larger for women than for men. 
EXPECTED AGE AT MARRIAGE & PARENTHOOD
Figures 2a and 2b show the mean expected age at marriage and parenthood by sex and ethnic group as reported in 2014/15. Given the small sample sizes caution is required in interpretation, especially because a high percentage of young people (around one-third of men, and one quarter of women) report that they "don't know" when they might get married (Table A.4) . Similarly, almost a third of young men and one fifth of young women are uncertain as to when they will start a family ( Among those who did give a numerical answer, women reported expected ages at marriage that were on average one year lower than those reported by men. Among both men and women in this sample, ethnic group variations in expected age at marriage are greater than ethnic variations in expected age at parenthood. Pakistani and Bangladeshi youth reported younger expected ages at marriage (around age 25 and 24 among men and women) as compared white British youth (28 and 27 respectively). Expected age at marriage among the small group of black Caribbean men is particularly high -at almost 30 years.
The overall reported expected age for entry into parenthood is 30 years for men and 28 years for women. Expected age at entry into motherhood is similarly high at around 27 years for young women from all of the south Asian ethnic groups suggesting a future postponement fertility from the earlier profile of entry into motherhood observed for the 1960-79 cohorts (Table 1) , particularly for women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage. Whilst among south Asian ethnic groups the expected mean age at parenthood is somewhat higher than that of marriage, among men and women of Black Caribbean heritage the expected mean age at marriage is actually higher than for parenthood. Given the small size of the sample who responded at wave 6, and high levels of uncertainty about expected age at marriage / parenthood, we do not go further in examining how these differences are mediated by individual and family background characteristics. Comparison of the first and second models for each family transition in Table 2 shows that the significant ethnic differences in expectation for family formation are not explained away by religiosity, parental background or the respondent's educational aspirations and employment experience. The odds ratios for ethnic group remain largely unchanged in the model of cohabitation expectation once other factors are controlled. For the models of expectation for marriage and parenthood, the odds ratios associated with ethnic group either stay the same or increase slightly when other factors are controlled.
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ARE ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN EXPECTATIONS FOR FAMILY FORMATION MEDIATED BY INDIVIDUAL AND PARENTAL BACKGROUND FACTORS?
As anticipated, religiosity is associated with family expectations -young adults who reported that religion makes little or no difference to their lives are one third more likely to be in the highest expectations group for cohabitation, and are significantly less likely to be in the highest expectations group for either marriage (odds ratio 0.59) or parenthood (odds ratio 0.79), as compared those for whom religion makes some or a great difference.
As found in previous studies, parental demographic behaviour is significantly associated with young adults' expectations. Young adults whose parents had stopped living together are less likely to have the highest expectations for marriage or parenthood. Those whose mothers had started childbearing in their teens are less likely to have the highest expectations for marriage, but also less likely to have the highest expectations for parenthood. Maternal education is positively associated with marriage and parenthood, but not significantly associated with expectations for cohabitation.
Young adults' educational aspirations were also associated with their expectations -low educational aspirations were associated with being less likely to expect to form a co-residential partnership. This is not the case for parenthood however, where educational aspirations did not seem to be relevant. Unemployed young adults had lower expectations for all three -cohabitation, marriage and parenthood. Current enrolment in education is associated with lower expectations for cohabitation and marriage but not associated with expectations for parenthood.
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DISCUSSION
Theories of family change highlight the role of generational succession in terms of younger cohorts embracing new secular norms regarding family formation (Lesthaeghe, 2010) . Understanding young peoples' expectations can provide insights into the new normative order (Manning et al., 2007) , and the likely ways in which white-British and second generation ethnic minority youth in the UK will make their demographic transitions to adulthood. This paper finds significant ethnic group differences in expectations for the timing and type of family formation which persist in a similar direction and magnitude once religiosity, parental background and individual characteristics are controlled. Whilst factors such as religiosity and experience of parental separation were associated with family formation expectations in the anticipated direction, such variables do not seem to mediate ethnic group differences.
A key finding is that expectations for family formation among second generation born in the 1980s are to some extent consistent with ethnic group differences observed for first generation migrants, and second generations born in the 1960s and 1970s. Marriage continues to be the expected partnership form for the majority of south Asian men and women, whilst cohabitation is normative among the black Caribbean and white British young adults. However some generational changes are observed, not least the anticipated delay to later ages of marriage and parenthood, especially among south Asian women. Moreover, there appears to be an increasing divergence within south Asian groups as to expectations for cohabitation, which are far higher among young second generation Indians, than Pakistani or Bangladeshi young adults.
Additionally expectations for cohabitation among south Asian men are considerably higher than for south Asian women. Below we discuss the possible interpretation of these findings in more detail.
A striking finding from this research is the continued expectation for marriage among youth from all ethnic groups. Despite increases in divorce and childbearing outside of marriage, young people are not rejecting marriage. Even among those groups who tend to marry less -the white British and Black Caribbean -very few men and women did not expect to marry. Whilst it could be the case that these positive survey responses are biased in that young adults feel normative pressure to report expectations for marriage, they are consistent with previous qualitative research suggesting that marriage continues to be seen as an ideal partnership form and the ultimate form of commitment.
In this paper we have found no evidence to suggest that the idea of marriage is being rejected by black Caribbean adolescents, which raises questions as how economic uncertainty and cultural traditions come together such that only a very few second generation black Caribbeans born in the UK in the period 1960-1979 had their children within marriage. This paper has provided new evidence that the continued desire for marriage co-exists with considerable uncertainty as to the age at which it will actually happen, especially among white British and black Caribbean youth. The uncertainty reported by white British and second generation black Caribbean youth as to whether they will marry contrasts with the firmer expectations found among south Asian young adults.
In the US, lower marriage rates among the Black population tend to be explained in terms of their disadvantaged economic position, and the idea that Black women place greater emphasis on requiring the economic support for marriage to be in pace, as compared their white counterparts (Manning & Smock, 1995) . Economic uncertainty may also be an important factor deterring marriage among second generation Black Caribbeans in the UK continue to face disadvantages in education and employment resulting in lower levels of social mobility (Platt, 2005) . However, evidence from qualitative work suggests that for many UK adults, there is often ambivalence about marriage which can be a low priority relative to other financial and family commitments such as securing stable accommodation and financing children's upkeep (Berrington, 2015b) .
Much has been documented about the role of cohabitation as a way of finding out more about a partner, and of marriage as the next natural step in the evolution of a partnership (Berrington et al., 2015b) . The individualised norms of the white majority emphasise 'love' in the selection of a spouse. Marriage decisions generally come after a prolonged period of courtship and period of cohabitation. This is in contrast to the types of marriages traditionally formed within south Asian communities where parents are often involved in the search for a spouse and the period of acquaintance prior to marriage tends to be short (Ahmad, 2012; Shaw, 2014) . However, marriage practices have been changing among Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in contemporary Britain, with young adults increasingly being involved in the choice of their spouse (Ahmad, 2012) . According to Twamley (2014) 'introduced marriages' where a period of courtship is permitted following a family-facilitated introduction, and 'love marriages' where the choice of marriage partner is based on affection, are increasingly common among second generation Gujarati Indians living in London. She finds that, just as for the white majority, 'love marriages' are likely to be preceded by a period of cohabitation as the relationship grows in a series of natural steps. This evidence from qualitative interviews is consistent with the findings of this paper whereby a significant minority of second generation Indians expect to cohabit. It should be noted however, that the role of cohabitation in the family life course varies across individuals and over time. Whilst cohabitation as a precursor to marriage may well increase among second generation Indians, cohabitation as an alternative to marriage and a setting for childbearing is not common (at least among the cohorts born [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] , in contrast to the experience of the white majority among whom childbearing prior to marriage is increasingly normative.
The findings from this paper suggest that the 'explorations in love' that Arnett (2000) describes as being a key feature of emergent adulthood, may not be equally present among all ethnic groups. Of particular interest is the possible divergence in the family formation experience of second generation young Indians, and young Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Further research is required to elucidate reasons for this differentiation which are likely to include religious beliefs and traditional marriage rules. In Islam, marriage is seen as the "only appropriate avenue for the regulation and expression of sexuality" (Ahmad 2012, p. 200) and among the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities premarital sexual experience continues to be frowned upon.
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in the UK have higher rates of consanguineous and transnational marriage than Indian communities in the UK (Shaw, 2014; Qureshi et al. 2014) . Marrying a spouse from overseas may prevent long periods of courtship prior to the wedding.
One of the motivations for this study was the very rapid increase in educational attainment among recent cohorts of ethnic minorities. Previous research has highlighted the role of educational expansion and increased gender equity in education and employment for the postponement of family formation, and among women increased childlessness (McDonald, 2000) . This paper has confirmed that second generation Indians born in the 1960s and 1970s were already postponing their entry into parenthood, which according to Dubuc (2012) Twamley (2014) suggests that among UK Gujaratis there is often an equal division of household chores among childless couples where both partners worked full time, but that after having children women continue to be expected to take on the caregiving role. Further research is needed to follow up these younger cohorts to see whether the mis-match between gender equity in the public and private spheres leads some women to delay or even forego partnership formation and childbearing, as has been documented in East Asia (Raymo et al., 2015) . Expectations for family formation are not static but change over the life course. It is quite possible that plans for partnership and childbearing will become more certain as these young people age and future research should consider using repeated measures of expectation for the same individuals as they are followed up within UKHLS.
It has not been possible with the data available to gain insight into the precise mechanisms that facilitate the intergenerational transmission of values towards family formation. Further research examining relationships with parents and parenting styles would be helpful in understanding ethnic group differences in the extent to which young adults have the freedom to undertake the sorts of explorations in love and partnership typical of emergent adulthood. More work is needed to understand why south Asian men are significantly more likely to expect to cohabit than south Asian women and whether this relates to the greater freedoms afforded to young men (Din, 2006) . Beyond 31 parental socialisation, the extent to which traditional patterns of family formation will be transmitted across generations within ethnic minority groups will be influenced by ethnic networks and transnational behaviour. Such information is not routinely available from the UKHLS but would be very useful if collected regularly.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper provides important new insights into the persistence of large ethnic differences in expectations for family transitions, but also important divergences within the south Asian communities which require further exploration and understanding.
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